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1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
The shipping market has from a legal standpoint long been divided into two, broad, 
market segments: liner shipping where vessels sail along regularly scheduled routes on 
a fixed timetable, and tramp shipping where vessels sail at the charterers’ discretion. 
Liner shipping has historically enjoyed exemptions from important segments of 
competition law allowing companies to establish “conferences” which set common 
prices for the shipment of goods on a particular route.1 The main reason for allowing 
this practice has been a general consensus that such agreements secure the stability of 
liner shipping companies which in turn secures the stability of international trade.  
There are today no organizations which openly try to set freight rates for the various 
tramp shipping market segments, nor would such activity be legal since tramp shipping, 
unlike liner shipping, is not exempt from any of the EC competition rules. However, 
whilst EC competition rules have applied in substance, implementation of the EC rules 
has been less effective. In almost all sectors of the economy the European Commission 
is responsible for investigating and upholding EC competition law. In the tramp 
shipping sector however responsibility for implementation has been left to the 
individual member states. For various reasons this has meant that the EC competition 
rules have not been effectively applied, a fact long recognized even by the community 
courts.2  
The Commission is currently going through an in depth review of competition policy in 
the shipping sector and in the autumn of 2004 the Commission published the “White 
Paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86”.  The White Paper focused mainly on the 
exemptions from the competition rules given liner shipping.  The industry has 
undergone significant changes in recent years and the question arose whether an 
exemption is still justified. In their review the commission looked at the four cumulative 
criteria of Article 81(3) for exemption and found that there was no conclusive evidence 
 
1  Examples of this are contained in EC regulation 4056/86, the United States Shipping Act of 1984 and 
the UN Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences. 
2 Ministere Public v Lucas Asjes ,Cases 209-213/84 [1986] 
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that the conditions were fulfilled in the present market circumstances. The Commission 
is therefore considering proposing a repeal of the current block exemption. The 
Commission does however appear to be open to consider a more limited block 
exemption or other legal instrument and has invited proposals from all parties. The 
White Paper also briefly discussed the current legal status of tramp shipping and 
proposed that the rules on implementation should be brought in line with all other 
sectors of the common market. The Commission pointed out that this would not mean 
any change in the substantive rules the tramp sector is already subject to, however since 
the reality of the EC’s current legislation has been a “legal limbo”3, with an almost total 
lack of enforcement, this is dramatic change for the industry. From submissions it 
received in advance of publishing its white paper it must have been clear to the 
Commission that such a change would cause a lot of uncertainty in the industry, but the 
White Paper was still surprisingly brief on the subject. The commission has however 
stated that it would consider issuing guidance on the implementation of competition 
rules to the sector. 
In this paper I will first look briefly at the way in which EC competition law has 
historically been implemented in the tramp shipping sector and then look at the 
proposed changes. I will then look at one important form of cooperation which is quite 
common in tramp shipping, namely the chartering pool, and try to do a similar review 
for tramp shipping chartering pools as the Commission did for liner shipping. The two 
main issues that arise are: 
1) Do chartering pool agreements infringe EC Article 81(1)?  
2) If chartering pools are in violation of Article 81(1), could they in some instances 
qualify for an exemption under Article 81(3)? 
The European Community Shipowners’ Association which has been working to 
maintain tramp shipping’s exclusion from regular implementation rules has put a lot of 
emphasis on just trying to show that there is effective competition in the tramp shipping 
market. The existence of competition in various tramp shipping markets is of course an 
important point; however as the Commission White Paper on Regulation 4056/86 
showed this has to be put in the context of a full review of the conditions in Article 81.  
 
3 Holman, Fenwick & Willan – Comments on White Paper on review of Regulation 4056/86, p.3 
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1.2 Limits to the scope of the paper 
Article 81 prohibits agreements between undertakings that are restrictive of 
competition. However two or more shipping companies may decide to establish a joint 
venture company to carry out their objectives. If such a company can perform as an 
autonomous economic entity on a lasting basis (a “full function” joint venture) such 
cooperation does not fall under Article 81, but is instead considered a merger and will 
be considered under the EC Merger Regulation. This paper will not discuss the merits of 
chartering pools under the EC Merger Regulation. 
1.3 Definitions 
Tramp Shipping – Regulation 4056/86 defines tramp vessel services as “the transport of 
goods in bulk or in break-bulk in a vessel chartered wholly or partly to one or more 
shippers on the basis of a voyage or time charter or any other form of contract for non-
regularly scheduled or non-advertised sailings where the freight rates are freely 
negotiated case by case in accordance with the conditions of supply and demand”4 
However one should note that this definition differs slightly from the traditional 
maritime definition which only distinguishes tramp shipping from liner shipping by 
organisational structure and does not emphasize the type of ship used, or how freight 
rates are negotiated. A “tramp” is a “ship which can be hired as a whole, by the voyage 
or the month, to load such cargo and to carry it between ports as the charterer may 
require”5
Liner Shipping –refers to maritime transport services that are provided on a regularly 
scheduled basis to pre-determined ports, and in accordance with timetables and sailing 
dates advertised in advance and available, even on occasional basis, to any transport 
user against payment.6 Ships typically involved in these trades are typically general 
cargo carriers, specialised cargo carriers (e.g. car carriers or refrigerated goods carriers) 
and partially or fully dedicated container carriers.  
Liner Conferences- Regulation 4056/86 defines liner conferences as two or more vessel 
operating carriers engaged in liner shipping operating under uniform or common freight 
rates and any other agreed conditions with respect to the provision of liner services.7
 
4 Regulation 4056/86, Section I, Article 1.3.a 
5 Fayle, “A short history of the world’s shipping industry” 
6 Regulation 4056/86, Section I, Article 1.3.b 
7 Regulation 4056/86, Section I, Article 1.3.b 
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1.4 Sources of law and method 
The primary source of law in EC law is the EC treaty8. EC competition law is contained 
in Chapter 1 of part III of the treaty which consists of Articles 81 to 89. The rules 
governing implementation of competition law were originally laid out by the Council in 
Regulation 17/62, which was recently replaced by Regulation 1/2003. 
The Commission can on authority from the Council issue block exemptions. These 
exemptions cover a whole category of agreements such as technology transfer or 
franchise agreements. For the maritime transport sector Regulation 4056/86 provides a 
block exemption for certain liner conferences and Regulation 823/2000 which grants a 
block exemption to certain liner consortia.  
The Commission previously had the sole power, subject to review by the community 
courts, to grant individual exemptions to undertakings9. Individual exemptions no 
longer exist and will gradually disappear as they expire. The Commission also has the 
power by decision to require an end to practices it finds infringe Article 81 or Article 
82. These decisions however can be appealed to the community courts. These 
exemptions and decisions provide guidance when interpreting competition law although 
it is important to remember that competition law is a quickly developing field and it is 
therefore necessary to look at the development of practice over time. 
Important guidance when interpreting EC law can be found in the Commission’s 
notices. These notices outline the Commission’s view on the current state of the law, 
and will also often explain the Commission’s views on issues that have not been dealt 
with, or are subject to interpretation. These are of course the Commission’s opinions 
and may differ from the opinion of the community courts. Of special relevance for 
chartering pools are the Commission’s “Guidelines on the applicability of Article 81 of 
the EC treaty to Horizontal cooperation agreements” and “Guidelines on the application 
of Article 81(3) of the Treaty”. 
Information can also be found on the Commission’s web site which publishes 
documents on the ongoing review of EC regulation. The web site contains consultation 
papers, White Papers and responses to these from interested parties. 
 
8 Based on the Rome Treaty 1957 and last  renumbered by the Amsterdam treaty 
9 Regulation 17/62, Article 9(1) 
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Finally there is abundant legal theory on EC competition law, however very little has 
been published relating to the tramp shipping sector since it has been in a legal limbo. 
2 EC competition law in the tramp shipping sector 
 
2.1 Historically and today  
The substantive competition rules of the EC treaty are contained in Article 81 which 
prohibits agreements between undertakings that restrict competition and article 82 
which prohibits abuse of a dominant position in the marketplace. According to Article 
83 the European Council was given the responsibility to adopt “appropriate regulations 
or directives to give effect to the principles” set out in the competition rules. This 
resulted in regulation 17/62 which became the principal regulation dealing with the 
practical application and enforcement by the Commission of the competition rules.10 
Regulation 17/62 did not however apply to the transport sector11 (rail, road, maritime) 
due to opposition from some member states. These sectors were only later regulated in 
individual regulations – in the case of maritime transport this was done in Regulation 
4056/86.  
Council Regulation 4056/86 established the rules of procedure for applying Article 81 
and 82 to the maritime transport sector and also provided for exemptions from certain 
parts of the rules for liner shipping conferences. However the regulation could more 
correctly be described as regulating liner shipping, not maritime transport in general 
since it does not apply to tramp vessel services or transport within one member state 
(“cabotage”). 
Regulation 17/62 was replaced in 2004 by Regulation 1/2003 which also repealed the 
rules of procedure found in Regulation 4056/86.  This did not result in any material 
changes though since an exemption for tramp shipping was maintained.12  
Whilst tramp vessel services have been excluded from the various competition 
implementing rules this does not mean that the substantive competition rules found in 
 
10 Bull[1991] p 96 
11 Regulation 141/62, Article 1 
12 Regulation 1/2003, Article 32 
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Articles 81 and 82 do not apply. There was initially uncertainty as to whether or not the 
EC treaty applied to the transport sector in general since the treaty of Rome Article 
84(2) had exempted air- and maritime transport from the treaty’s general provisions on 
transport. It was therefore claimed that maritime transport was exempt from all the 
provisions of the EC treaty. The courts rejected this view in French Merchant Seamen 
Commission.13
Until such regulations on implementation called for in Article 83 were enacted Article 
84 prescribes that “the authorities in member states” shall rule on “the admissibility of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices and on abuse of a dominant position in 
the common market in accordance with the law of their country and with the provisions 
of Article 81, in particular paragraph 3, and of Article 82”. Since implementing rules 
have never been enacted for tramp vessel services this rule still applies.  
2.2 Enforcement 
The main responsibility for enforcement of EC competition rules in the tramp shipping 
sector lies therefore with the “authorities” in each member state. Exactly who is 
encompassed by the term “authorities” was defined by the community courts in BRT v. 
SABAM14 as “either the administrative authorities entrusted, in most member states, 
with the task of applying domestic legislation on competition subject to the review of 
legality carried out by the competent courts, or else to the courts to which, in some 
member states, that task has been especially entrusted.” The problem that persisted for a 
long time however was that most member states lacked national provisions giving any 
such “administrative authority” – for example national competition authorities – power 
to directly enforce EC competition rules.15
The Commission which is usually responsible for enforcement still has a certain role. 
According to Article 85 the commission has a duty to ensure the application of the 
principles laid down in Articles 81 and 82, and to do this the Commission may 
investigate the matter and propose appropriate measures. However the Commission has 
very limited powers as far as sanctions go, both when requesting information during an 
investigation and to enforce proposed measures. The commission may only publish 
 
13 Case 163/74 [1974] 
14 Case case 127/73 
15 Stemshaug – Maritime transport and antitrust in the EC and US – EC shipping policy p.103 
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their decisions and authorize the member state to take the measures needed to remedy 
the situation.16
Finally there is the question of to what extent private individuals may seek to enforce 
the competition rules in Articles 81 and 82. In general the ECJ stated in BRT v. SABAM 
that Articles 81 and 82 “tend by their very nature to produce direct effects in relation 
between individuals concerned which the national courts must safeguard.” In other 
words individuals may use the courts to enforce the competition rules. However Article 
84 gives the authorities (as defined above) and not the national courts the jurisdiction to 
rule on competition matters when no implementing regulations have been enacted 
according to Article 83. So can national courts rule that an agreement is contrary to 
Article 81 in such a case? This question was raised in Ministère public v. Lucas Asjes et 
al17, a case regarding air transport, an area where no implementing regulations had been 
adopted at the time. In its ruling the ECJ stated that in such cases national courts could 
not rule an agreement as automatically void (cf Article 81(2) cf Article 81(1)). The 
ECJ’s principal argument seems to be that Article 84 gives the public authorities, not 
the national courts of a member state the jurisdiction to rule on whether an agreement is 
exempted according to Article 81(3) from the rule in Article 81(1). Accordingly a 
national court cannot rule that a practice is contrary to article 81 as a whole if neither 
the competent national authorities, or the Commission pursuant to Article 85(3), have 
taken any decisions on exemption. 
In conclusion one may note that even though individual member states have been under 
treaty obligations to ensure that Articles 81 and 82 are applied, and even though the 
Commission has had authority to investigate cases and make recommendations which a 
member state could not refuse to implement18 this has not proven to be an effective way 
of enforcing EC competition rules. This has probably been partly due to the lack of 
competent authorities in the member states, but overall there has also been a lack of 
political will in the individual member states. The member states responsible for 
implementation are also those states with the largest shipping communities and the most 
vocal industry interest groups. Finally one point of interest to note is that the exemption 
found in Regulation 1/2003 refers to “international tramp vessel services as defined in 
                                                 
16 Article 85(3) 
17 case 209-213/84 [1986] 
18 Faull & Nikpay p.919 
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Article 1(3)(a) of Regulation 4056/86”19. As was commented above this definition 
differs from the traditional maritime definition and makes the term tramp shipping 
dependent on “freight rates [being] freely negotiated case by case in accordance with 
the conditions of supply and demand.” It would therefore seem possible to argue that if 
this condition is not met in a market because of the activities of, for example, a pool 
then Regulation 1/2003 will apply.  
2.3 Proposed Changes 
A review of Regulation 4056/86 was initially begun in 2002 and in 2003 the 
Commission published a consultation paper inviting responses from maritime service 
providers, users and other interested parties regarding the need to modernise Regulation 
4056/8620. Based on this and other information the European Commission published in 
the autumn of 2004 a white paper reviewing the regulation. The main part of the review 
looked at whether there was still a justification under Article 81(3) for the block 
exemption for liner shipping conferences, but the review also looked at whether there 
were grounds for maintaining the exclusion of tramp services from the competition 
implementing rules in Regulation 1/2003.  
The grounds originally given in Regulation 4056/86, in recital 4 of the preamble, for the 
exclusion of tramp services seem to be that rates for tramp services were “being freely 
negotiated on a case-by-case basis in accordance with supply and demand conditions”21. 
In other words since there already was a competitive market for tramp shipping there 
was no need to include it in Regulation 4056/86. As the Commission stated in its initial 
consultation paper22 such a description would apply to most de-regulated services and is 
therefore not a compelling reason for excluding tramp shipping from the regular 
implementing rules regarding Articles 81 and 82. Besides political resistance from some 
member states another possible reason for this somewhat peculiar exclusion could be 
that because of the different nature of the tramp market it was not deemed necessary for 
tramp to enjoy the same exemptions from the application of Articles 81 and 82 as liner 
conferences. However this does not justify why the Commission did not include tramp 
shipping in Section II of Regulation 4056/86 which contained rules on implementation.  
 
19 Regulation 1/2003, Article 32(a) 
20 Commission Services document – Consultation paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86 
21 Regulation 4056/86, Preamble, recital 4 
22 Consultation paper p. 11 
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The consultation process did not provide any arguments which the Commission found 
convincing for continued exclusion of tramp shipping from the general enforcement 
rules and one of the conclusions of the White Paper was that Article 32 of Regulation 
1/2003 exempting tramp shipping should be repealed. In all likelihood tramp shipping 
will therefore in the future be included in Regulation 1/2003 and subject to its rules on 
implementation. Interestingly the consequence of the new regulation is that national 
competition authorities and national courts will be given more responsibility in 
implementing EC competition policy in order to relieve the Commission of some of its 
work load. However the new regulation states that the Commission and the national 
competition authorities should form a network of public authorities applying the 
competition rules in close cooperation23 so that there will be a uniform application of 
the rules. The new regulation is also aimed at ensuring that Articles 81 and 82 are more 
frequently applied by the national courts. Article 3(1) of the regulation states that 
national courts must apply Articles 81 and 82 when applicable, and the recital to the 
regulation calls for cooperation between the commission and national courts to ensure 
consistency in application. Even though application will therefore still largely be the 
responsibility of national authorities there is little doubt that if the tramp exclusion is 
repealed there will be a much more consistent and uniform application of the rules in 
the sector. 
Under the old Regulation 17/62 an agreement which was in breach of article 81(1) 
might still be valid if it was subject to either a block exemption such as Regulation 
4056/86 or an individual exemption. Individual exemptions were essentially 
assessments by the Commission as to whether or not an agreement fell qualified for 
exemption under Article 81(3). Under the new regime however individual exemptions 
no longer exist.24 Agreements either infringe or do not infringe Article 81 as a whole.25 
Businesses must themselves assess whether or not an agreement it is party to is in 
breach of Article 81(1), and if it is in breach, if it could be exempt according to Article 
81(3). There is therefore an increased risk that companies will be in violation of 
competition laws because they incorrectly assess their agreements under Article 81. For 
the tramp shipping industry this poses some extra difficulties since it has up till now 
been excluded from Regulation 17/62. Accordingly there is no case law or 
 
23 Whish p 257 
24 except for a few given under Regulation 17/62 that still remain in force 
25 Whish p 168 
  10 
                                                
administrative practice from the Commission specific to agreements found in tramp 
shipping, such as pooling agreements, which could provide guidance for the industry. 
The prospect of implementation of Regulation 1/2003 in the tramp shipping sector has 
therefore caused concern among some market participants because of the legal 
uncertainty that arises surrounding some of the activities in the sector such as the pool 
system. This uncertainty was raised as an argument against implementation of the 
regulation, however as the Commission pointed out this legal uncertainty has always 
existed and was created by the lacking application of the competition rules under the 
existing rules. The Commission did state in its white paper that it would provide 
guidance to shipowners. However recent indications are that guidance may not be 
forthcoming for a year or two and that a repeal of the tramp exemption may occur first. 
This is of concern for the shipping community which is therefore currently preparing its 
own proposal for a set of guidelines which is to be published in the late spring of 2005 
in order to get things moving. Shipowners wish to avoid risking costly litigation to 
establish the extent of the competition rules which is what they feel happened in the 
case of the liner trade.26 Once the tramp exemption is repealed recital 38 of Regulation 
1/2003 will allow companies to seek informal guidance from the Commission on their 
agreements. This guidance does not in any way prejudge assessments from the 
Community Courts and assessments will only be given to agreements that pose “novel” 
or “unresolved” questions.27 For the time being shipping companies can only await the 
Commission’s promised guidance on implementation in the sector and try to assess 
agreements based on current general guidance from the Commission and previous 
decisions as I will do in the next section. 
3 Chartering pools and the Tramp Shipping Market  
3.1 The Chartering Pool 
Cooperation between shipping companies may take many forms. This paper focuses on 
of the most common – the chartering pool. A chartering pool is an arrangement under 
 
26 From Conversations with Jan Fritz Hansen, director of The Danish Shipowners Association. 
27 Guidelines 81(3)  
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which several shipowners establish a common vehicle to market and charter out their 
tonnage.28 The purpose of such a pool is to maximize the combined income from 
vessels committed to the pool.29 Increased profits may be a result of efficiency gains 
involved in operating a larger fleet of ships, but depending on the market as a whole it is 
also possible that the cooperation in itself may lead to improved freight rates. Another 
reason for participating in such a pool is that it is a way of sharing risk - each 
participant’s income will probably fluctuate less than if they had operated 
independently. It is possible to imagine a pool consisting of ships of all kinds, for 
example even a pool which consists of a mix of tankers, container ships and car carriers 
would lead to benefits for the owners from reduced fluctuations in income and possibly 
other benefits from joint purchasing depending on the extent of the pooling agreement. 
Chartering pools however are made up of similar types of ships since this will create the 
most synergies.  
There are numerous possible variations in the way in which a chartering pool may be 
structured but the basic features are: 
a) The participants independently control a number of vessels  
b) The vessels are placed under the care of a joint administration. The vessels are 
usually deemed to be on time charter to the pool. This means that capital expenses and 
fixed voyage expenses (crew, supplies, insurance) are borne by the owner, and variable 
voyage expenses (bunkers, port charges, etc) are borne by the pool. However, unlike a 
standard time charter, hire is dependant on the pools overall performance over time.  
c) The administration markets the vessels as a single commercial fleet under a common 
trade name and collects freight earnings.  
d) The combined net earnings are then distributed to the individual owners in 
accordance with a distribution key.30
From a competition law point of view several features of such an agreement are 
noteworthy. First of all there is the creation of a common vehicle for marketing and 
chartering out of all the ships of the participating undertakings. Secondly, pool 
agreements will usually contain a non-compete clause barring the participants from in 
any way operating in competition with the pool any vessels of substantially the same 
 
28 Falkanger et .al, Scandinavian Maritime Law. The term “chartering pool” is used in a broader sense by 
Gombrii to also cover pools with individual marketing, however in a later article Gombrii [1993] uses the 
term in a similar sense as Falkanger et.al. 
29 Bull [1991] p. 89 
30 Bull [1991] p.185 
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type as those operated by the pool.31 Third, the agreements regulate the individual 
participant’s right to withdraw from the pool, usually requiring a notice period before a 
party is allowed to withdraw their ships from, and compete with the pool. Fourth, the 
pool will usually regulate or imply joint purchasing of variable voyage costs. Finally 
pools often involve exchange of information of both a technical and commercial nature 
between the participants. 
 
3.2 The tramp shipping market 
In this section I will briefly look at market power and market definition within the tramp 
shipping sector. A lot of the information in this section stems from a study32 
commissioned by the European Community Shipowners Association (ECSA) for use in 
a workshop with the Commission where the ECSA made their case in favour of pools. 
Considering that the study contains numerous data on fleet size, company size, market 
share of top 20 companies etc. it is interesting to note one omission in the study - any 
data on pool market share.   
The tramp shipping sector33 can be divided into two broad segments.  
1) Bulk shipping – which transports large cargo parcels34 of goods such as grain and 
iron ore in “bulk carriers”, and oil in oil tankers. 
2) Specialized shipping – which transports “specialized” trades such as chemicals, 
LNG, LPG and motor vehicles using ships that are often purpose built. 
The industry has several characteristics which makes it conducive to competition. The 
commodity – ships – is relatively homogenous. This is especially true of bulk shipping 
where there is usually not much differentiation possible between vessels or between 
owners.  
The industry is quite transparent - information on pricing is circulated quickly by the 
shipbroking business and so is information on operating costs. 
Entry costs are low – Because of the degree of transparency potential entrants can easily 
calculate profit margins. A certain amount of equity is required for entry, but 60-80% of 
financing is usually available in the form of loans secured by a mortgage in the ship. It 
is also possible to enter the market with a relatively limited degree of shipping 
 
31 Røsæg, Organisational Maritime Law, p. 99 
32 The Tramp Shipping Market – Clarkson Research Studies 
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knowledge since most tasks can be outsourced quite easily. Ship management firms can 
take care of the actual running of the ship and ship brokers will find employment for the 
vessel. The exception is some specialist sectors where a certain degree of expertise may 
be needed which is difficult to acquire quickly.  
Ships are by nature very mobile - This point is specifically made in the eighth recital to 
Regulation 4056/86  which states that “the mobility of ships, which is a feature of the 
structure of availability in the shipping field, subjects conferences to constant 
competition which they are unable as a rule to eliminate.” The quote refers to liner 
shipping, but is possibly even more relevant in international tramp shipping were ships 
are constantly being sent wherever the last charterer decides. Markets are in many cases, 
especially for larger vessels, global. 
From a company perspective the market is quite fragmented. The Clarkson study further 
divides the tramp shipping market into 10 sub markets: Bulk carriers, Forest products 
carriers, Crude oil tankers, Oil products tankers, Chemical tankers, LPG carriers, LNG 
carriers, Reefers, RORO and Car carriers. The total fleet operating in each market varies 
between about 1000 and 5500 ships, with the exception of LNG carriers where there are 
only 158, yet the average company in each market only owns between 2 and 6 ships. 
The largest companies in each segment account for only around 4-5% of the market.  
On the buy side shippers are often very large international companies or trading houses 
and will have a certain amount of buying power. 
The markets identified by the study are of course not identical to the markets as they 
would be defined for the purposes of EC competition law. Judgements from the 
community courts have shown that the relevant definition of the market is essentially a 
matter of interchangeability,35- for example if two vessels can be interchanged they are 
in the same market. On the one hand a 300,00dwt bulk carrier does not compete in the 
same market as a 10,000dwt bulk carrier due to factors such as cargo size and port and 
canal limits. On the other hand large cargoes may be broken up and f.ex. motor vehicles 
can be transported by not just car carriers, but also container ships, bulk carriers, and 
even reefers (refrigerated ships). Regardless of the exact definition of the individual 
market the study does indicate that in most markets there will be numerous companies 
participating.  
 
34 Parcel – the individual consignment of cargo 
35 United Brands v Commission, Case 27/76 [1978], and Whish p. 28 
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The relative size of pools compared to the market they operate in is an elusive number 
to find, it was not presented to the Commission in their discussions with the ECSA, nor 
do the major shipbroking firms keep track of this statistic. However, it is probably in the 
niche markets were a pool is most likely to achieve a significant size compared to the 
total market. According to Tradewinds, an international shipping newspaper, 
“specialized pools such as Bergesen’s VLGC pool control 30% of the market, carry 
considerable clout” and the trend is that pools are increasing in size as they become 
more established.36 In the handysize Chemical/products tanker market the Handytanker 
pool quite quickly built up to a 20% market share which caused some concern that the 
pool could become large enough to manipulate the market, especially if there was a bull 
run in the market.37   
 
Low barriers to entry and numerous market participants are characteristics which reduce 
a pool’s ability to achieve and maintain any degree of market power. On the other hand 
judging from one ship brokerage report it appears that market participants do engage in 
pooling in the belief that this is can be “an effective means for reducing competition in 
markets with too much capacity”38 The general opinion of the shipbroking community 
seems to be that whilst it may be possible for a pool to achieve higher rates in a tight 
market it is very difficult to influence prices in a poor market unless the pool has an 
extremely large market share. In the 1970’s Maritime Fruit Carriers and Stolt Nielsen 
suffered financial difficulties despite at some points controlling around 80% of their 
respective markets.  
4 Do Chartering Pools Infringe Article 81(1)? 
 
For Article 81(1) to apply four requirements have to be fulfilled, there has to be 
 
1) An agreement, decision, or concerted practice, 
2) between “undertakings”, 
 
36 Tradewinds, 6/8/04, p.18 
37 Drewry chemical forecaster 1Q2005, p.43 
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3) that has at its “object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition, 
4) and there has to be an effect on trade between member states. 
 
Some pooling arrangements will not fall under Article 81(1) by their very nature. First 
of all this will be the case where the participants in the pool are not actual or potential 
competitors. This will of course depend on how you define the relevant market but will 
for example clearly be the case in a pool between two companies with very different 
types of ship. One might also question whether a single vessel company which is 
basically a financial investment vehicle for investors is truly an actual or potential 
competitor in the market. Such companies outsource all operations with commercial 
operations handled by a chartering pool. Without chartering pools it is doubtful that 
such investment vehicles would exist. 
Secondly cooperation between competing companies can also occur without falling 
under Article 81(1) if the companies involved could not carry out the project or activity 
covered by the cooperation independently.39 This is in effect a related argument to the 
previous one excluding undertakings that are not competitors. If for example there are 
four companies in a market and two of them are too small to independently compete for 
a very large contract of affreightment a pooling of ships between them in order to be 
able to bid for the contract would not fall under Article 81(1).  The two companies 
would not have been able to bid for the contract independently and so they are not 
competitors in this particular situation. The argument has been put forward that a critical 
mass in terms of a minimum number of ships is required in order to be able to operate in 
the market. In other words a company with only one or a few ships would always be too 
small to be able to compete. If this premise is accepted then a pooling of ships in order 
to reach such a critical mass would not fall under Article 81(1). However according to 
the numbers in the study commissioned by the ECSA there are numerous companies 
that exist today which own only one or two ships and which apparently are still able to 
operate in the market. This seems to suggest that any such critical number of ships is 
very low. Such a pool of two or three vessels would also probably escape article 81(1) 
because any possible effect on competition would likely be insignificant.  
 
38 Poten & Partners on the Exmar and Golar LNG pool. 
39 Guidelines, paragraph 24 
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4.1 Undertakings 
First of all article 81(1) only applies to agreements between undertakings. The concept 
of an undertaking encompasses every entity engaged in an economic activity regardless 
of legal status of the entity and the way in which it is financed40. Shipping pools are 
usually formed between ship-owning companies which may be organized in various 
fashions – public, private, state owned or otherwise. Any activity involving commercial 
shipping trade is clearly engaged in economic activity and covered by this broad 
definition. 
4.2 Agreements, decisions and concerted practices 
A broad interpretation has also been given to the terms “agreements”, “decisions” and 
“concerted practices” and the terms are not limited to legally enforceable agreements.41 
Pools are often organised as a limited company or a partnership, a Pool Management 
Company (“PMC”), owned by the participants. In these instances the pool agreement 
may take the form of a shareholders agreement or form a part of the company 
agreement. As long as the company is not a full function joint venture the company 
agreement is regarded as an agreement between the participating undertakings. 
Pools may also be mere abstractions – there is no formal pool structure, simply 
payments directly between the participants.42 Since even so called “gentleman’s 
agreements” and simple understandings have been held to be agreements43 in the sense 
of Article 81 by the courts it seems clear that any cooperation in the form of a pool 
would qualify as an agreement. 
4.3 Trade between member states 
For an agreement to affect trade between member states it must “have influence, direct 
or indirect, actual or potential44, on the pattern of trade between member states.” This 
effect on trade does not have to be harmful or negative, it is sufficient that there is an 
effect. The effect does however have to be appreciable. Since this criterion is considered 
easily fulfilled by goods and services traded between member states,45  and tramp 
 
40 Hofner and Elser v Macrotron GmbH, Case C-41/90 [1991] 
41 Whish, p. 91 
42 Røsæg, Organisational maritime law, p84 
43 Chemifarma NV v Commission, Case 41/69[1970] 
44 Consten and Grundig v Commission (Cases 56 and 58/64 [1996] 
45 Faull & Nikpay, paragraph 2.104 
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shipping is by definition international,46 it seems likely that this criterion will in most 
cases be met by agreements concerning the shipping industry. Shipping carries out a 
large portion of the EC’s trade in goods, 33% of intra-community trade and 90% of the 
trade between the EC and third countries is seaborne.47 Even agreements involving liner 
shipping companies that only directly concerned trade outside the EC have been found 
to indirectly affect transport services inside the EC and therefore fall under article 
81(1).48
 
4.4 Competition Analysis - object or effect of preventing, restricting or 
distorting competition 
Competition law is an area of the law closely linked to economics and when 
determining whether or not an agreement has the “object or effect of preventing, 
restricting or distorting competition” some economic analysis is usually always 
required. In order to demonstrate that an agreement infringes Article 81(1) because it 
has or would have a restrictive effect on competition it is necessary to take into account 
the actual conditions of the market in which it functions. This requires determining 
amongst other things the product market, the geographic extent of the market, and the 
market’s competitive structure.49 This extensive analysis however is not necessary if the 
agreement contains “obvious restrictions of competition such as price-fixing, market 
sharing or the control of outlets”50, in other words if the agreement can be said to have 
has as its object the restriction of competition. Object and effect are alternative 
requirements51 and so if an agreement restricts competition by object it is not necessary 
to show that there is a restrictive effect, and vice versa. Accordingly a natural starting 
point is to ask whether chartering pool agreements can be said to have as their object the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition. In this context “object” refers to the 
objective meaning or purpose of the agreement in the economic context in which it is to 
be applied, the subjective intention of the parties is not relevant.52 Thus even if the 
                                                 
46 as opposed to ”cabotage” 
47 Dinger p.8 
48 Compagnie Maritime Belge Transports SA v Commission Case 395-396/96[2000] 
49 The Commission has provided guidance on how to determine the market in its Notice on the Definition 
of the Relevant Market OJ[1997] C 372/5 
50 European Night Services v Commission, Cases T-374/94 [1988]  
51 Societe Minierer v Maschinenbau Ulm, Case 56/65 [1966], and Faull p.81 
52 Whish p. 110 
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stated purpose of a chartering pool is a more effective utilization of the pools’ ships, 
which in itself would be beneficial to competition it, the agreement can still have as its 
object the restriction of competition. 
4.4.1 Object Analysis  
As mentioned above price fixing is one type of agreement that has been considered by 
the courts to have as its object the distortion of competition. This does not merely 
include blatant price fixing between competitors but any agreement that directly or 
indirectly suppresses price competition. One form of cooperation the Commission has 
been wary of, and considers a form of price fixing, is the joint selling agreement.53 In a 
joint sales agreement producers or suppliers of a good or service grant to a common 
agent or joint sales organization the right to sell their products or services. Such practice 
is regarded by the commission as a horizontal cartel since it entails joint determination 
of all commercial aspects including determination of price. As mentioned, in a 
chartering pool a joint entity markets the ships of several owners as a single commercial 
fleet. The ships are deemed to be on a modified form of time charter to the pool 
management company which handles all chartering of the vessels to third parties. Since 
the management company is trying to maximise the profits of the fleet as a whole the 
ships of the different owners are not bid against each other when competing for a 
contract. The result is that competition on price between the participants in the pool has 
been eliminated. This is a typical example of a joint selling agreement. Chartering pool 
agreements usually contain a non-compete clause forbidding the participants from 
operating in competition of the pool which entails that the participants vessels are 
exclusively marketed and chartered out by the joint entity. However even if there is no 
exclusivity a joint sales agreement will still exist if in practice the bulk of the sales of 
the participants is done through the joint sales agency.54 According to the Commission’s 
“Guidelines on Horizontal Cooperation Agreements” commercialisation agreements 
involving joint selling have as a rule the object and effect of coordinating the pricing 
policy of competitors, and will therefore restrict competition and fall under Article 
81(1)55.  Chartering pool agreements do not deviate from this rule in the sense that they 
do coordinate the pricing policy of the participants. Accordingly chartering pool 
 
53  Floral, Ansac OJL152/54[1991], guidelines, paragraph 144  
54 Floral [1989] OJ L39/51, and Faull p. 403 
55 “Guidelines to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements” Paragraph 144-145 
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agreements are a form of price fixing which can be said to have as their object the 
restriction of competition.  
There have been some examples of the courts finding that joint sales agreements have 
not fallen under Article 81(1) where the agreement is between SME’s (Small Medium 
sized Enterprise). There is in other words still a requirement that the agreement has a 
minimum effect on the market even though it has been found to have as its object the 
restriction of competition. This will be discussed in further detail in section 4.5 on the 
“de minimis” doctrine. 
Since chartering pool agreements constitute a form of price fixing which the 
Commission regards as having as their object the restriction of competition it is not 
strictly necessary to analyse if such agreements also have a restrictive effect to establish 
that chartering pool agreements infringe Article 81(1) as long as there is also an 
appreciable effect on competition. The effect of such an infringement is that the 
restrictive elements of the agreement in question are void and unenforceable unless the 
contract is inseverable.56 A full analysis of an agreement will therefore usually entail 
that each possibly restrictive element will be examined to see if it has the object or 
effect of restricting competition. However this will only be the case were the agreement 
contains restrictive elements that are distinct from each other in their purpose. Where an 
element of the agreement can be said to be the adjunct of an anti-competitive practice it 
will be assessed in combination with that practice. In the case of chartering pools this 
implies that if the sole or principal object of the agreement can be said to be the creation 
of a joint sales agency it will not be necessary to examine the other elements of the 
agreement since these will be examined in conjunction with the joint sales function and 
we have already established that this portion of the agreement has as its object the 
restriction of competition.  
Certainly the main purpose of a chartering pool, as defined by Falkanger57 and in this 
paper, is to establish a common vehicle to market and charter out their tonnage, in other 
words a joint sales agency. The other restrictive practices which are to be found in 
chartering pool agreements regarding for example revenue pooling, restrictions on 
withdrawal from the pool and information exchange are all necessary clauses in order to 
 
56 The text of article 81(2) seems to indicate that the entire agreement is void, however the courts have 
found (Societe de Vente de Ciments et Betons de l’Est SA v Kerpen & Kerpen, Case 319/82 [1983]) that 
the automatic nullity only applies to those contractual provisions which are incompatible with Article 
81(1) 
57 Falkanger et.al.,  “Scandinavian Maritime Law”  p. 151  
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secure a proper functioning joint sales agreement. It would of course be possible to 
imagine a stand alone agreement involving for example information exchange, however 
in the context of a chartering pool agreement such a restriction is adjunct to the main 
competitive restriction and will therefore be examined in conjunction with it. 
A further effects analysis of the other competitive restraints found in chartering pools is 
therefore not strictly necessary and a study purely focused on chartering pools could 
therefore proceed to an evaluation of the question of appreciability and, if an 
appreciable effect were to be found, examine if chartering pool agreements could fulfil 
the requirements for an exemption according to Article 81(3). 
4.4.2 Effects Analysis 
Before proceeding with a further analysis of chartering pools I will however devote 
some time to an effects analysis of some of the other clauses in chartering pool 
agreements that potentially contain competitive restraints. This will provide at least 
some guidance as to what forms of cooperation might or might not infringe Article 
81(1) for pooling agreements that stop short of having joint sales as their main purpose. 
As mentioned chartering pool agreements contain several clauses which entail 
cooperation in a manner potentially restrictive to competition. These other forms of 
cooperation may have as their object the restriction of competition themselves or they 
may have to be individually assessed to determine if they have the effect of distorting 
competition to an appreciable extent. Briefly there are three important factors when 
undertaking an effects analysis under Article 81(1). First of all there is the nature of the 
agreement. Some forms of cooperation are more likely than others to have a restrictive 
efffect. Secondly there is the market share of the parties. A low market share makes a 
restrictive effect unlikely. Finally there is the market structure. Agreements between 
parties in a highly concentrated market make a restrictive effect more likely. An in 
depth assessment is beyond the scope of this paper however I will discuss in general 
terms to what extent such cooperation may be considered to restrict competition. 
4.4.2.1 Joint purchasing 
In a chartering pool the pool management company is usually responsible for payment 
of all voyage related costs such as bunkering, port charges, canal dues and agency fees. 
The owner on the other hand is responsible for all capital and running costs such as loan 
repayments, interest, insurance, maintenance, and manning. The centralization of 
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purchasing is beneficial to pool members for two reasons. First of all overall 
administrative costs are reduced, and secondly the pool will have a stronger negotiating 
position due to its increased size which may lead to lower prices. Despite the benefit to 
competition of being able to negotiate lower prices joint buying is not considered 
entirely unproblematic from a competition law perspective.58 Joint buying is not 
considered to have as its object the restriction of competition unless the cooperation 
does not truly concern joint buying but serves as a tool to engage in a practice such as 
price fixing. However purchasing agreements may end up having a restrictive effect on 
competition and so have to be analysed in their specific context looking at both the 
purchasing and selling markets. 
The main competition concern is that a cooperative group with sufficient buying power 
will be able to force suppliers to accept prices below a competitive level without 
passing along these price reductions downstream. This may lead to increased costs for 
competitors as the supplier is forced to raise prices for other customers, i.e. the groups 
rivals’, to try to make up for the large price reductions.59 There are also other possible 
negative effects which may arise. If the supplier is forced to accept sufficiently large 
reductions in price this could lead in the long run to inefficiencies such as reduced 
quality or less innovation from the supplier. Sufficient buying power in the upstream – 
procurement – market may therefore lead to inefficiencies in the marketplace.  
Joint buying may also lead to competition problems in the downstream –selling- market. 
First of all by potentially raising prices for competitors, as described above, or even by 
limiting competing buyers’ access to efficient suppliers. Secondly the savings provided 
by the joint buying agreement can act as an incentive for the participants to the 
agreement to coordinate their behaviour on the selling market as well so that less of the 
benefit is passed on to the consumers. Such coordination will be facilitated by the 
commonality in costs that result from joint purchasing. 
It is clear that in order for the competition concerns described above to arise the 
participants to the joint purchasing agreement must have more than an insignificant 
market share in both the upstream and the downstream markets. There is no absolute 
threshold above which one can state that competition issues arise but in its guidelines to 
 
58 Guidelines, paragraph  124 
59 Guidelines, paragraph 126 
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horizontal agreements60 the Commission indicates that below a market share of 15% in 
either market it is unlikely that a joint purchasing agreement will infringe Article 81(1).  
As mentioned a pool management company is usually responsible for the voyage 
related costs such as bunkering and port charges. Such goods and services are required 
by more or less the entire shipping industry and the market for such goods will therefore 
in most cases consist of not just the market the pool operates in but most tramp shipping 
markets and to a certain extent liner shipping as well. It is therefore unlikely that any 
pool will have a market share of over 15% for such goods or services and consequently 
unlikely that any joint buying agreement will infringe Article 81(1).   
4.4.2.2 Restrictions on withdrawal from the pool 
Chartering pool agreements also regulate the participants’ right to withdraw one or more 
of their vessels from the pool. The agreement itself will usually stipulate a relatively 
long period of validity, however changing circumstances may lead to a participant 
wishing to withdraw from the agreement early. The conditions for withdrawal from the 
pool will of course vary but withdrawal usually requires the participants to give notice 
anything from 6 to 12 months in advance and in some cases even longer. In some pools 
withdrawal also results in an economic penalty such as the charter of any substitute 
vessels being for the account of the party withdrawing or even an obligation to sell any 
pooled vessels to the pool at a reduced price.61 This will naturally discourage any 
participant from leaving the pool. This is a problem since it means that potential 
competition is being restricted. A potential competitor is usually defined as any firm 
which would enter the market in response to a small but significant increase in price. If 
an undertaking leaves the pool it would operate in competition with it and a common 
problem for pools is that in very good markets participants will be tempted to try to 
operate on their own.62 Potential competition is an important factor when assessing 
market power since the prospect of new entrants to a market will discipline price 
setting. However to be a potential competitor a firm has to be able to enter the market 
relatively quickly to act as a constraint on prices. Relatively quickly has been 
considered to be less than a year,63although it could be longer if firms already present in 
the market would require even longer to adjust their own capacity. An agreement which 
 
60 Guidelines, paragraph 130 
61 Bull[1991], p. 96 
62 Tradewinds  
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restricts potential competition by preventing a company from leaving the pool may 
therefore have a negative effect on prices and therefore be considered to restrict 
competition.  
4.4.2.3 Non compete clauses 
As mentioned chartering pool agreements usually contain a non-compete clause barring 
the participants from in any way operating in competition with the pool any vessels of 
substantially the same type as those operated by the pool.64 Despite the name non-
compete clauses do not automatically come within the prohibition in Article 81(1). In 
order to determine whether or not such clauses do infringe Article 81(1) it is necessary 
to examine what the state of competition would be if the clause did not exist.65 In Remia 
the vendor of a company could have set up a new business and potentially driven the 
old company out of business without a non compete clause. According to the courts the 
non compete clause therefore had “the merit of ensuring that the transfer has the effect 
intended” and contributed to the promotion of competition by increasing the number of 
undertakings in the market.66  
There also some block exemptions that exempt non-compete clauses in such cases as 
exclusive distribution agreements67 and franchising.68 These block exemptions clarify 
the limits of allowable non compete clauses for certain categories of agreements but 
follow from the principles of Remia and Pronuptia exempting only that which is 
necessary in order to ensure the main, beneficial, purpose of the agreement.  
4.4.2.4 Information exchange 
Transparency in the marketplace is essential for competition, however one can 
distinguish between public and private market transparency.69 Public market 
transparency, for example through advertising, allows the consumer to compare 
products and services, and their prices, and thereby increases competition. Private 
market transparency on the other hand only increases market transparency for the 
undertakings involved and may lead to restrictions of competition if it leads to 
 
63 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, paragraph 26 
64 Røsæg, Organisational Maritime Law, p. 99 
65 Remia BV v Commission, Case 42/84 [1985] 
66 Presumably by ensuring that there is a market for the sale of companies.  
67 Regulation 1983/83 
68 Regulation 4087/88 
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coordination of policies between undertakings. Competition is believed to work best 
when the participants take independent decisions, not when there is peaceful 
coexistence.  
When assessing an information exchange agreement there are three key factors – market 
structure, the type of information exchanged and how frequently it is exchanged.  
The market structure is a relevant factor since the greater the number of market 
participants the more difficult it will be for a market participant to predict or anticipate 
the conduct of all its competitors.  
The type of information exchanged is of course the most important factor. The courts 
stated in the Sugar case70 that statistical information may be exchanged directly between 
undertakings or via trade associations as long as the information does not enable the 
identification of individual undertakings. Aggregate data exchanged therefore has to 
consist of information from at least three companies. Organized exchange of individual 
data on the other hand, would likely be regarded as a practice with the object or effect of 
restricting competition. This is the case not just for price information but also sales 
volumes71  and general terms of sale. The age of the information exchanged is also an 
important factor. If information on future conduct of the undertaking is exchanged the 
courts will presume that the agreement has both the object and effect of restricting 
competition.72 Historical data more than one year old on the other hand will as a rule not 
be caught by Article 81(1).73 Finally the more frequently information is exchanged the 
greater the potential restrictive effect is. 
In a chartering pool agreement detailed information on all present and future 
commercial aspects will be available to the participants and the joint entity in part in 
order for the pool to function and be marketed as a single fleet. The information 
exchange in this case is accordingly adjunct to the joint sales function and is therefore 
assessed in conjunction with that function. An agreement to exchange of a similar level 
of information but without joint sales would most likely be found to infringe Article 
81(1). The European Liners Affairs Association, an industry interest group for liner 
shipping companies, has forwarded a proposal to the commission which suggests that a 
 
69 European Commission, Information exchanges among firms and their impact on competition, (1995) 
and Faull, p 425 
70 Suiker Unie and others v Commission Cases 40-48/73  [1975] 
71 UK Agricultural Tractor Registration Exchange OJ L68/19 [1992] 
72 Huls v Commission, Case C-199/92[1999] 
73 Faull & Nikpay, p. 429 
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possible replacement for the block exemption in regulation 4056/86 could include an 
information exchange program which involves the exchange of market data between 
one and three months old aggregated by an independent body which would be made 
publicly available. Even this level of exchange has met with some scepticism if it could 
lead to price forecasting. 
 
4.4.2.5 Cooperation on technical matters 
A pool might also include agreement on a uniform standard for technical equipment or 
procedures. Agreements which have as their sole object and effect technical 
improvement or cooperation are not caught by Article 81(1). Regulation 4056/86 
specifically states in article 2 that such agreements do not fall under Article 81(1) for 
the sectors covered by the regulation. However this article is merely of a declaratory 
nature. The regulation does not state that article 2 is to be an exemption and the case law 
of the commission and the courts has made it clear that such agreements in general are 
not caught by Article 81(1).74 It should be noted however that the reason technical 
agreements do not fall under Article 81(1) is that they as a general rule do not restrict 
competition, not because they qualify for any type of block exemption. If an agreement 
on technical matters were to have a restrictive effect on competition it would fall under 
article 81(1) since its sole object and effect would no longer be the achievement of 
technical improvements or technical cooperation.75   
 
4.4.3 Ancillarity 
It has been suggested76 that pool arrangements may be considered acceptable because of 
the ancillary restraints doctrine. In the article in question this doctrine is briefly 
presented as stating that for an agreement “if the overall result is good, relatively minor 
anti-competitive flaws will be accepted.” I am somewhat sceptical to this possibility. 
First of all since the description of the doctrine seems to be derived from the judgment 
in Wouters v Algemene Raad van de Nederlansche Orde van Advocaten where the 
courts stated that in certain cases it is possible to balance non-competition objectives 
against a restriction of competition and find that the former outweighs the latter. 
 
74 Annex to the white paper on the review of Regulation 4056/86, p.40-41 
75 FETTCSA, OJ L 268 [2000], paragraph 147 
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However the breadth of the rule in Wouters is limited to regulatory rules adopted for the 
protection of consumers – “regulatory ancillarity”77- which clearly does not cover 
chartering pool agreements.  
Another incarnation of the ancillary restraints doctrine developed from judicial practice 
is the notion of commercial ancillarity. The unifying idea behind these judgments can 
be said to be that restrictions to competition in an agreement may fall outside of article 
81(1) if they are necessary to achieve a legitimate commercial purpose such as the sale 
of a business or the penetration of a new market78. This definition illustrates the 
problem I see with trying to argue commercial ancillarity when it comes to chartering 
pools:  
- Chartering pools function as joint selling agreements.  
- The joint sales function is not an ancillary clause in a chartering pool agreement; it is 
the principal purpose of the agreement. The ancillary restraints doctrine cannot therefore 
apply.  
Another problem as I understand it is the fact that the doctrine applies to restrictions 
which are necessary to achieve a legitimate commercial purpose. The Commission’s 
view is that joint selling agreements are by object restrictive to competition regardless 
of the subjective intentions of the parties. The restriction of competition can hardly be 
deemed a legitimate commercial purpose. This would at least require that one finds that 
the agreement qualifies for exemption under Article 81(3). This would also be a 
problem if one were to argue that the other restrictions found in chartering pool 
agreements which are ancillary to the joint sales function might benefit from the 
doctrine. 
In Gøttrup-Klim Grovvareforeninger v Dansk LandbrugsGrovvareselskab AmbA, a 
central case in commercial ancillarity the community courts did find acceptable non-
compete clauses necessary to maintain the bargaining power of a joint buying 
cooperative.  However joint buying agreements are not considered as restrictive to 
competition as joint selling agreements since they tend to give smaller buyers greater 
bargaining power which may even be beneficial to the market as a whole especially if 
the market is dominated by large suppliers which was the case in Gøttrup Klim. 
However the non-compete clauses were restricted to what was necessary to ensure the 
                                                                                                                                               
76 Gombrii in Bull[1991], p.200 
77 Whish p 122 
78 Whish p.119 
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legitimate purpose – a functioning cooperative which could maintain contractual power 
in relation to its suppliers.  
As the courts clearly stated in Metropole television v commission there is no “rule of 
reason” under article 81(1). In EC competition law the weighing of pro- and anti- 
competitive aspects of the chartering pool occurs when determining whether pools 
qualify for an exemption under article 81(3). 
 
 
4.5 The De Minimis Doctrine 
The de minimis doctrine states that “an agreement falls outside of the prohibition in 
Article 81(1) where it has only an insignificant effect on the market, taking into account 
the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in 
question”79 The doctrine applies to all agreements whether they are restrictive to 
competition by object or effect and so even agreements involving hardcore restrictions 
will not infringe Article 81(1) if the agreement does not in fact have an appreciable 
effect on the market. The requirement of an appreciable effect on trade between member 
states mentioned in 4.3 also follows from the de minimis doctrine. The Commission has 
provided some guidance as to when an agreement is considered not to have an 
appreciable effect on competition through the publication of a series of “de minimis” 
Notices80. The most recent Notice states that for horizontal agreements (i.e. agreements 
between actual or potential competitors) if the aggregate market share of the participants 
does not exceed 10% of the relevant market then the agreement does not appreciably 
affect competition. This negative definition cannot be interpreted antithetically and so 
an aggregate market share which exceeds 10% does not automatically entail an 
appreciable effect. In such cases it is necessary to individually determine the actual 
effects on the market.  
The Notice does not however apply to horizontal agreements containing certain hard 
core restrictions, namely – a) the fixing of prices when selling to third parties, b) 
limitation of output or sales, and c) allocation of markets or customers.81  These three 
examples of restrictions are the same three as the courts used in European Night 
 
79Volk v Vervaecke, case 5/69 [1969] 
80 The Commission’s notices are not legally binding 
81 De Minimis Notice, Article 11 
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Services as examples of agreements that have as their object the restriction of 
competition. Indeed earlier versions of the Notice used the term “have as their object” 
when defining the agreements which do not fall under the de minimis notice, however 
this was left out in the current notice. One possible reason for this could be to indicate 
that that the de minimis notice may apply to some agreements that have as their object 
the restriction of competition just not the three types of restriction specifically stated in 
the Notice.  
Joint sales agreements are regarded by the Commission as a form of price fixing82 and 
are therefore outside the scope of the de minimis notice. As explained earlier chartering 
pools are a form of joint sales agreement and accordingly there is no assurance that the 
commission would not proceed against a pooling arrangement even though it has a 
market share of less than 10%. The Notice was last updated in 2001 and previous to this 
the de minimis limit for horizontal agreements was 5% market share. There were few 
examples of the Commission challenging agreements below this level even when 
restrictions outside the scope of the de minimis notice were involved83 and with the new 
notice the commission will presumably rarely challenge agreements involving market 
share less than 10%. The de minimis doctrine does after all apply to hard core 
restrictions as well. As the courts stated in Javico even absolute territorial restrictions 
may escape prohibition “if it affects the market only insignificantly.”84 In the SAFCO 
ruling the courts found that a joint sales agreement between several small undertakings 
producing vegetable preserves with a market share of 6 to 7% was not in violation of 
Article 81(1). On the other hand in Miller85 a similar market share did not prevent the 
agreement from being found to infringe Article 81(1). 
There is in other words no “safe harbour” level for price fixing agreements and it has 
been suggested that the commission would pursue such agreements to “ensure that a 
competition culture was developed and maintained in a particular sector of the 
economy.”86 It is of interest to note that the Guidelines to Horizontal cooperation 
agreements, the Commission uses an example of five small food producers who 
combine their distribution and sell their products at a common price with a combined 
market share of 10%. According to the notice this is an example of price fixing which 
 
82 See for example Notice on horizontal cooperation agreements paragraph 138 
83 Faull&Nikpay p.85 
84 Javico, Case 5/69 [1969] 
85 Miller v Commission, Case 19/77[1978] 
86 Faull&Nikpay p.85 
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therefore falls under Article 81(1) even though the participants could not be considered 
to have market power.87 (The example does however find that the agreement is exempt 
under Article 81(3) since it leads to lower costs and better service for the consumers).  
 
5 Could Chartering Pools qualify for Exemption under Article 81(3)? 
 
It seems likely therefore that the basic features of a chartering pool agreement infringe 
Article 81(1). If Regulation 1/2003 comes to encompass tramp shipping in the future the 
Commission, national competition authorities and the courts will have the power to 
apply all the provisions of article 81. Unless an agreement is found to fulfil the 
conditions for exemption in article 81(3) the agreement may be found null and void for 
those portions that are incompatible with Article 81. 
The basic requirement in article 81(3) is that if the net effect of the agreement is 
beneficial, and this benefit is to general welfare, not just to the parties involved then the 
provisions of Article 81(1) may be declared inapplicable. Article 81(3) does not 
distinguish between restrictions by object or effect and so any agreement may qualify 
for exemption, even agreements on hardcore restrictions, if the agreement leads to 
sufficiently beneficial results.88  There are four cumulative and exhaustive conditions 
which have to be fulfilled for an agreement to be exempted under article 81(3): 
i) The agreement must produce an improvement in the production or distribution of 
goods or in technical or economic progress. 
ii) A fair share of this benefit must go to consumers. 
iii) Any restrictions of competition must be indispensable to the beneficial effects of the 
agreement. 
iv) The agreement must not substantially eliminate competition in the market. 
An assessment of an agreement under Article 81(3) will be made on the basis of the 
facts as they exist at any one time. Accordingly an exemption will only apply as long as 
all four conditions are fulfilled. 
 
87 Guidelines , paragraph 156. 
88 MatraHachette v Commission case T-17/93, [1994], paragraph 85 
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5.1.1 Contribution to economic progress 
The first condition for exemption is that the chartering pool agreement must in some 
way contribute to improving production or distribution of goods or promoting economic 
progress. One can distinguish between two types of improvements or efficiencies. First, 
cost efficiencies which provide an indirect benefit to the consumer for example from 
savings which can be shown with reasonable probability will at least partly be passed on 
to the consumers. Secondly, qualitative efficiencies which more directly benefit the 
community in the form of improved goods or services. When assessing whether an 
agreement results in any benefits or efficiencies relevant issues are:89  i) The nature of 
the claim. ii) The link between the agreement and the benefit – indirect effects may be 
too uncertain to be taken into account. iii) The likelihood and magnitude of the benefit – 
cost efficiencies should be as accurately and reasonably as possible be estimated, 
qualitative efficiencies should be explained how and why they are an economic benefit. 
iv) How and when each benefit is achieved. 
A chartering pool agreement provides several benefits to its participants. A pool spreads 
out risk by having more vessels in the market and can also further reduce risk for the 
individual participant by diversifying its contracts of affreightment. A pool may operate 
vessels in the spot market and charter vessels out on medium and long term charters 
which will lead to a greater stability of income in the long run. The notion of “stability”, 
both in income for the liner companies and in freight rates for shippers, was an 
important justification for Regulation 4056/86, however in the White Paper review of 
4056/86 the commission seems to abandon the idea that stability can be achieved by 
allowing anti-competitive practices citing an OECD report which concluded that the 
most competitive markets seem to provide the greatest stability, and that there is no 
evidence that the shipping industry is unique in its cost structure and therefore in any 
need of protection.90 Lower risk and stability are therefore probably less relevant as 
benefits today. 
 There are however other benefits from chartering pools which may potentially produce 
more substantial cost and qualitative efficiencies. 91 First of all the chartering pool 
system can lead to a rationalisation of the pools resources:  
 
89 Guidelines 81(3), paragraph 51,  OJ C 101/97 [2004] 
90 Annex to the White paper on 4056/86, p.6 
91 The economics of bulk shipping pools, Haralambides pages 2-6 
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A combined fleet leads to economies of scale. A pool will have a stronger negotiating 
position since it will be purchasing goods that represent variable voyage costs such as 
bunkers and stores in larger quantities and making use of shipping agents more 
frequently. This strengthened position can in turn potentially lead to lower prices. The 
likelihood and magnitude of such savings are probably limited as even large pools will 
not constitute a large share of the consumption of such goods. Pools may be able to 
enter larger volume contracts and receive credit but this does not appear to be a 
significant factor for the operation of the pool.92 Greater savings for the shipping 
companies are probably achieved by management contracts which outsource technical 
management of the ships such as manning and supervising technical standards, however 
such management contracts do not form a part of charter pool agreements. Economies 
of scale are also achieved from reduced administration costs through the centralization 
of commercial activities such as purchasing. In a closely integrated pool the participants 
may also benefit from improved credit worthiness due to increased capital resources and 
the firm may thereby be able to reduce its capital costs.  
Pooling may also lead to economies of scope which entail a more effective usage of the 
ships. A larger fleet of pooled vessels allows increased flexibility by enabling the pool 
to engage in cross trading which may lead to higher load factors, and minimize ballast 
legs and idle time. Cross trading occurs if for example a shipper has a set amount of 
cargo he wishes to have transported at regular intervals for a certain time from point A 
to point B. From point B there may not be much suitable trade going back in the other 
direction to point A and the shipowner would have to return the ship in ballast (i.e. 
empty). Alternatively the shipowner could look for suitable cargoes which need to  be 
shipped from point B to point C where there are cargoes available that need to be 
shipped back to point A. In such a scenario the vessel is used more efficiently, the 
owner has a more continuous and higher stream of income which in a competitive 
market could lead to lower rates to the benefit of the consumer. However such a system 
of cross trading requires a larger fleet of ships in order to function. As mentioned earlier 
the average shipping company only owns a couple of ships and so for these companies 
to be able to engage in cross trading a pool system is required. The extent to which it 
will be possible to achieve savings from such operations will depend on the market the 
ship operates in. Bulk transport is probably the area where it is most likely that such 
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efficiencies can be achieved since ships trading in this market can carry a wide variety 
of goods. For crude oil and gas transport however pool participants have expressed that 
there is little or no such activity.  
A sufficiently large pool will also be able to operate in a wider market or even globally 
and therefore benefit from increased visibility and marketing. It will also have a larger 
network of information channels through brokers and agents. This could lead to 
increased efficiency for the pool both in terms of load factor and by allowing it to react 
faster to changes in the market. 
Cost reductions and productivity increases such as these have been held by the 
community courts to improve the production of services.93 One exception according to 
the notice on horizontal cooperation is saving which result only from the elimination of 
costs that are inherently part of competition. For example savings made because a pool 
can choose to send the closest vessel is not an improvement in efficiency when 
assessing an agreement under Article 81(3), nor are lower marketing expenditures. 
Savings must result from the integration of the logistical systems of the participants. 
Hence savings that arise because a combined fleet allows for a greater degree of cross 
trading will be regarded as an increase in efficiency. 
Pooling can also lead to qualitative improvements which are more directly beneficial to 
the consumer. In the past decades there has been an increased requirement for a global 
presence and service from the shipping industry as ever larger industrial conglomerates 
and trading houses have emerged. These companies have required transport of large 
volumes of cargo, at regular intervals, over longer periods of time. Given the 
fragmented state of shipping markets few companies have been able or willing to bid 
for such contracts on their own. Companies may be physically unable to compete for 
such contracts or unwilling to take the risk of devoting all their vessels to one long term 
contract. Larger companies also demand greater flexibility. For example the option of 
not nominating a destination until the voyage is underway. Such flexibility is easier to 
accommodate for a larger fleet. Pools therefore provide improved services which at 
present cannot be provided individually except by a relatively small number of 
companies. Pooling might therefore also lead to greater competition for large scale 
contracts of affreightment. Improved logistics and efficiency can also provide vessels 
with fewer delays and less waiting time for the shipper which can translate into reduced 
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costs for the shipper. Finally pools may also increase the supply of vessels in the market 
by lowering barriers to entry. Pools allow players without any first-hand knowledge to 
enter the market, allowing groups of financial investors to take advantage of a high 
market and order a new ship to be operated under a management contract and 
commercially run by a pool. Increased supply should lead to lower prices which will 
benefit consumers. 
An important source for guidance as to how Article 81 might be applied in the future 
can be found in the Commission’s previously granted individual and block exemptions. 
Especially relevant is Regulation 832/2000 which provides a block exemption for liner 
shipping consortia. Consortia in terms of Regulation 823/2000 are defined as 
agreements between two or more liner shipping companies with the object of 
cooperating “in the joint operation of a maritime transport service and which improves 
the service that would be offered individually by each of its members in the absence of 
the consortium, in order to rationalise their operations.”   
In the preamble the main reasons for providing the block exemption are given as 
“Consortia...generally help to improve the productivity and quality of available liner 
shipping services by reason of the rationalisation they bring to the activities of member 
companies through the economies of scale they allow in the operation of vessels….and 
economic progress by facilitating and encouraging greater utilisation…and more 
efficient use of vessels.”94  Improvements in scheduling and better quality, personalized 
services are also mentioned. These are more or less exactly the same benefits that 
chartering pools provide which might indicate that chartering pools at least generate 
relevant benefits. Whether or not this will be sufficient to fulfil the conditions in Article 
81(3) will depend on the individual pool and market. 
There are some examples in the industry where pooled capacity has been deliberately 
withdrawn from the market because of oversupply. In Synthetic Fibres (1984-l207/17) 
producers collectively reduced capacity because of oversupply in the market and this 
was held to improve production by bringing production capacity more in line with 
demand. However it is uncertain to what extent this case can be held as a precedent for 
such “crisis cartels”. It is unclear exactly what the benefit to the consumer would be in 
such a case, and this was exactly the reason the courts gave in their decision in SPO and 
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others v Commission95 which found the relevant agreement ineligible for exemption. 
Regulation 4056/86 permits capacity regulation for liner shipping but only where it 
consists of “temporary or short term adjustments… [it] does not exempt capacity non-
utilisation agreements because their only effect is to raise the level of prices and they do 
not involve any improvement of services”96
  
5.1.2 Benefit to consumers 
The second condition contained in Article 81(3) states that a fair share of the benefit 
that results from the agreement must go to the consumer. The term consumer is widely 
defined and includes not only private individuals as end users, but also any undertaking 
purchasing a good or service in the course of business. In the case of chartering pools 
the consumer would normally be any entity which charters a vessel from the pool. 
There was previously no definition of “fair share” and this was a point where the 
commission had a certain margin of appreciation97. More recently however the 
commission has stated that “the concept of fair share implies that the pass-on of benefits 
must at least compensate consumers for any actual or likely negative impact caused to 
them by the restriction”98. The net effect of the agreement on the consumers must 
therefore be at least neutral. It is not however necessary for the consumer to receive a 
share of every one of the different benefits generated by the agreement. 
This new guidance has some precedence in earlier decisions by the Commission to the 
effect that the benefits claimed of the agreement must be of value to the community as a 
whole and the advantages must outweigh any detriments.99 In this regard the 
Commission has declined to accept that an agreement leads to an improvement if the 
distortion of competition is disproportionate. 100  
Four factors in particular are taken into account when assessing whether or not cost 
efficiencies are being passed on to the consumer101: i) The characteristics and structure 
of the market – the greater the degree of competition the more likely it is that 
undertakings will try to increase sales by passing on savings in the form of lower prices. 
 
95 Case T-29/92 [1995] 
96 Trans-Atlantic Agreement, OJ L-376 [1994], paragraphs 365-366 
97 Whish p 156 
98 Guidelines to 81(3), paragraph 85  
99 Whish p.151 and Consten v Grundig 
100 Whish p151 from Screensport/EBU 
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ii) The nature and magnitude of efficiency gains  - according to economic theory 
consumers are more likely to receive a fair share of cost efficiencies in the case of 
reductions in variable costs than in reductions of fixed costs. iii) The elasticity of 
demand – the portion of cost savings passed on also tends to depend on the extent to 
which consumers respond to changes in price. The greater the increase in demand from 
a reduction in price the greater the pass on rate. iv)The magnitude of the restriction of 
competition – if substantial restrictions of competition are created by an agreement large 
cost efficiencies are required for a sufficient share to be passed on to the consumer.  
There is of course also the matter of the qualitative benefits created by the agreement 
where one will have to resort to a certain amount of value judgment to be able to assess 
the overall benefit to the consumer. 
The characteristics of the relevant market will necessarily vary a great deal, however as 
was noted earlier there are some general characteristics such as low barriers to entry and 
numerous market participants which make it likely that there will still be competition in 
the market. This increases the likelihood of cost efficiencies benefiting the consumer. 
When it comes to the nature of the efficiency gains the costs involved in operating a 
shipping company include a very high proportion of fixed costs. Maintaining an 
operative fleet costs a high fixed amount even when the ships are unemployed. Variable 
costs where reductions are most likely to be passed on to the consumer constitute a 
significantly smaller proportion of total costs. In a chartering pool operation the pool is 
responsible for the variable voyage costs and there could be some economies of scale 
which reduce costs. Unfortunately though as mentioned earlier these cost efficiencies 
are probably limited. Other savings from pooling involve fixed costs which the 
Commission assumes that the participants have no direct incentive to pass on.102
Tramp shipping is also a relatively inelastic market. Whilst the percentage share of 
shipping costs will vary from product to product overall they are quite low. Even in 
today’s record high shipping market the transport cost of a barrel of oil from the Persian 
gulf to the US east coast is only a couple of percent of the value of the oil. In the 
opinion of one shipbroker the transportation cost for oil is more or less irrelevant for the 
total volume transported by the oil companies. Shipping costs are relatively higher for 
bulk transport and one can distinguish between high and low value cargoes. Some 
cargoes such as coal and iron ore may end up having shipping costs close to value and 
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will have a greater degree of price elasticity but overall transportation costs are still 
quite low and the markets not very price sensitive. Accordingly pools usually have no 
incentive to lower prices in the belief that a lower price will be offset by a higher 
volume of goods transported. 
Finally the magnitude of the restriction of competition that results from a chartering 
pool agreement is important since an increase in market power gives the participants the 
ability and incentive to raise market prices. This has to be balanced against any cost 
efficiencies which might provide an incentive for lower prices.103 There does seem to be 
reason to question whether chartering pool agreements result in significant cost 
efficiencies that are passed on to the consumer.104 The level to which competition is 
restricted by an agreement will vary case by case, but for a balancing of these two 
opposing forces any restriction would probably have to be limited.  
Possibly equally as important to an assessment of the overall benefit to consumers as 
the cost efficiencies generated by the chartering pool system are the qualitative benefits 
to consumers from improved service and greater flexibility. This can lead to savings for 
the consumer from fewer waiting days and being able to guarantee a ship within a 
smaller window of time. For example a trading company buying a cargo will usually 
cover the purchase by a letter of credit until the cargo is received by the end buyer who 
pays for the goods. If the shipper can be sure of a shorter time window for shipment the 
letter of credit can be issued for a shorter time for a lower cost. Whilst such benefits can 
be quantified evaluating most other qualitative benefits is largely a value judgment.  
According to the industry the problem is getting shippers to actually admit to the fact 
that they do see benefits. However such improvements are clearly a benefit to the 
consumer and were recognized as such by the Commission in Regulation 823/2000. It is 
at least of interest to note that The European Shippers Council which has been very 
critical to the block exemption in regulation 4056/86 in a response to the latest review 
of Regulation 823/2000 stated that they had no major problems with liner consortia. Of 
course Regulation 823/2000 does not allow for any coordination of prices between the 
participants of a consortium. 
 
103 Guidelines 81(3), paragraph 101 
104 This is in line with the opinion of one shipping market researcher who stated that although he knew of 
no studies specifically looking at pass on of cost efficiencies he doubted that the consumer would see any 
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As mentioned earlier the Community courts have interpreted Article 81(3) such that the 
advantages claimed from the agreement must outweigh any detriments. Regulation 
823/2000 might again be used for guidance on this issue. In the liner consortia 
exemption the commission clearly found that the benefits provided exceeded the 
negative effects from restriction of competition. For chartering pools the benefits 
achieved are very similar, however the restrictive practices are different. Whilst 
Regulation 823/2000 does exempt several activities such as coordination of sailing 
timetables, joint operations of terminals and port installations and pooling of vessels and 
revenue it did does not allow any form of price fixing. Price fixing between 
undertakings is of course considered very detrimental to competition and must have an 
effect on any evaluation of net benefit. According to the Guidelines on Horizontal 
Cooperation price fixing, since it is a hardcore restriction, “can generally not be 
justified, unless it is indispensable for the integration of other marketing functions and 
this integration will generate substantial efficiencies.”105 This does not mean that price 
fixing precludes exemption however the assessment will be closely related to the market 
power of the pool and the level of competition present in the market. In 
AustrianAirlines/Lufthansa the Commission approved an agreement for individual 
exemption which covered joint pricing and market sharing between two airlines. The 
benefits in that case were quite similar to the potential benefits from pooling. The 
Commission foresaw cost savings, better planning of frequencies, higher utilization and 
improved services for the consumer. The deciding factor will therefore probably be the 
magnitude of the different effects. As the market power of the pool increases the 
negative effect from the participants’ joint pricing will increase, and presumably the 
amount of savings passed on from rationalisation will decrease. One practical 
consequence of this is that there will be a limit to how large a market share a pool may 
have before it becomes ineligible for exemption. 
 
5.1.3 Indispensability 
Article 81(3) is only applicable to a chartering pool agreement to the extent that the 
restrictions to competition contained in the agreement are necessary to achieve the 
benefits identified in the first condition. Hard core restrictions usually fail to fulfil this 
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condition since the more restrictive the restraint the stricter this condition is. However 
in the right circumstances any restriction could be held to be indispensable. In order to 
satisfy this condition the question of indispensability has to be assessed in a two-fold 
test.106 First of all the agreement as such must be necessary in order to achieve the 
relevant efficiencies. In this case the question will be whether there is any other 
economically practicable and less restrictive means of achieving the benefits identified 
other than through a joint sales agreement. Secondly the individual restrictions of 
competition that are adjunct to the main agreement must also be necessary. In other 
words each restriction such as the non-compete clause and joint purchasing agreement 
must be assessed to decide whether they are reasonably necessary in order to achieve 
the benefits. 
As mentioned earlier the Commission exempted liner consortia in Regulation 823/2000 
from the provisions of Article 81(1) for activities such as pooling of vessels, port 
installations, cargo, revenue, and net revenue. However the commission specifically 
excluded any form of joint fixing of freight rates between consortium members, 
presumably in part because the commission did not consider such a clause 
indispensable. Since the benefits achieved by liner consortia are more or less similar to 
those that arise from chartering pools it could therefore seem like Regulation 823/2000 
might signal that the Commission does not consider the main purpose of a chartering 
pool, the joint sales agreement, as indispensable and that similar benefits can be 
generated in shipping without such restrictions. However there are some fundamental 
differences in the ways in which liner and tramp shipping operate which might lead to a 
different conclusion. The companies in a liner consortium operate a shipping service on 
a particular trade between certain pre-determined ports. There are therefore substantial 
benefits to be gained from pooling port installations and coordinating sailing timetables. 
Yet once there is agreement on a beneficial trading pattern and schedule it is still 
possible for the companies to compete on price for individual shipment along a portion 
of the route. In tramp shipping however cooperation will necessarily take a different 
form. There is not a set route or a set timetable which the members of a pool can divide 
between them. A cross trading system requires a central commercial marketing agency  
which coordinates where the ships sail and this agency would not function if each 
owner individually competed for various cargoes between various ports. Since tramp 
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shipping is such a generic product it is also difficult to imagine a way of separating the 
marketing function from the sales function.  
Even though Regulation 823/2000 did not exempt joint sales or joint price 
determination, there are examples of the commission accepting such practices in block 
exemptions such as Regulation 4056/86 and in individual exemptions. In Austrian 
Airlines/ Lufthansa107 for example the airlines involved received an exemption for a 
joint venture for traffic between Germany and Austria. The companies not only 
established an integrated transport system with joint network planning and pooled 
revenues and costs, but also operated a joint pricing policy. The Commission found that 
both the object and effect of the joint venture was to coordinate competitive conduct, yet 
still found Article 81(3) applicable. This type of service seems in some respects to be 
comparable to liner shipping – set routes and timetables to transport goods/passengers -  
but in this case the commission found that “the extent of integration envisaged in the 
cooperation agreement [was] necessary to achieve the objectives set” and accepted the 
joint pricing policy.108 The Commission did set some conditions regarding pricing, the 
parties had to apply any price cuts they introduced on other routes to three other routes 
on which they faced no competition. According to the Commission this would provide 
new entrants with “some protection” from predatory pricing, a wording which seems to 
indicate that the Commission was willing to accept quite an extensive restriction of 
competition as indispensable. 
A chartering pool system which includes joint sales may therefore be considered 
indispensable for the attainment of the main benefits of the agreement. The Commission 
has stated that it will not second guess the business judgment of the parties but will only 
intervene where it is reasonably clear that there are realistic and attainable 
alternatives.109 In my opinion it is not clear that there are other forms of cooperation that 
could achieve the same benefits. 
 The benefits are however more or less solely a result of economies of scale and of 
scope and in such instances the Commission has stated that the undertakings concerned 
are required to explain why the same efficiencies could not be attained through internal 
growth. Why does the average company only own two vessels? Could the same not 
have been achieved through consolidation in the industry? A lack of financial capacity 
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is probably part of the answer. At the moment shipping companies are very profitable, 
but the industry is volatile and historical returns up until 2003 were only around a 7% 
return on equity. Access to capital markets has also been limited since there have been 
few public companies. This may be changing and industry insiders predict more M&A 
activity in the future.110 On the other hand the good times in shipping have seldom 
lasted more than two years and a downturn might halt consolidation. 
The second part of the indispensability assessment is to look at the individual 
restrictions of competition. 
As mentioned earlier chartering pools often contain non-compete clauses which bar the 
participants from operating in competition with the pool any vessels of substantially the 
same type as those operated by the pool.111 When assessing a non-compete clause one 
has to look at the state of competition if the clause had not existed. One can distinguish 
between clauses encompassing all vessels owned by the participants and those just 
covering vessels committed to the pool. For pooled vessels the argument might be made 
that for the pool to operate vessels have to be committed to the pool exclusively. Joint 
chartering is the central purpose of the agreement and would not function if the owner 
tried to compete with the central chartering agent. It is more doubtful whether a similar 
argument can be made for a non-compete clause preventing participants from trading 
vessels outside the pool.  
According to Røsæg in “Organisational Maritime Law” “pool contracts usually restrict 
the participant’s right to compete with the pool…” because a participant who offers 
vessels in competition with the pool “would increase the total offer in the market, and 
could thereby affect the pool’s profits adversely.” As the ECSA has pointed out 
however pools are not designed to create and take advantage of market power. Increased 
competition in the market cannot in itself be used as an argument for non-compete 
clauses. The main benefits from a chartering pool come from the pool acquiring a 
critical mass which allows it to attain economies of scale and of scope. Once this critical 
mass has been achieved it does not seem necessary for the functioning of the pool that 
the owners have all their vessels committed to the pool. On the contrary one more 
competitor will just help to ensure that benefits are passed on to the consumer through 
competition and thereby ensure that the pool will qualify for exemption under Article 
81(3). The main argument for why a non compete clause needs to cover all vessels is 
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that the participants in a pool will receive inside information on the activities, contracts, 
customers and strategic planning of the pool which could be used to the pools detriment. 
This information exchange could of course also be used to coordinate activities of the 
pool and ships nominally operating outside the pool to the consumers detriment. 
This touches upon another form of restriction of competition which was discussed under 
article 81(1) namely information exchange. Whilst literature on chartering pools stresses 
the importance of information for the longevity of the pool112 this seems to in part be 
founded in a need to ensure “mutual trust and confidence”. It might therefore be 
possible to operate the chartering of the vessels behind a “Chinese wall” so that 
information exchange is minimized and participants can operate vessels outside, and in 
competition with pooled vessels. A general non-compete clause such as those 
commonly found at present in chartering pool agreements may therefore not be 
indispensable in their entirety. 
Restrictions may also be indispensable for a limited time only. Examples of this are 
clauses regulating withdrawal from the pool. Such clauses are usually in the interest of 
the parties involved to avoid future conflict, but are also required according to the 
condition of indispensability. In Regulation 823/2000 it is stated that in order to prevent 
consortia from imposing restrictions of competition which are not 
indispensable….agreements should contain a provision enabling each shipping line 
party to the agreement to withdraw from the consortium provided it gives reasonable 
notice.”113 Reasonable notice according to the block exemption depends on the level of 
integration of the consortium. The notice period is usually 6 months and notice may first 
be given after a period 18 months after the agreement was entered. However for highly 
integrated consortia which have either net revenue pools or purchased/chartered vessels 
specifically for the consortium the notice period is 6 months which may be given after a 
period of 30 months after the agreement was entered. In tramp pool agreements notice 
periods of 6 or 12 months are not uncommon but may be may in some cases be even 
longer114. Chartering pools do not have an initial lock in period but this may still appear 
excessive when compared to Regulation 823/2000. Notice periods of 6-12+ months may 
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therefore be questionable in terms of indispensability unless it can be explained by 
differences in the tramp- and liner- shipping markets. 
Both liner shipping conferences and tramp shipping pools sail their fleets in trading 
patterns that may require a certain number of vessels in order to function and as such 
may encounter difficulties if a participant wishes to withdraw suddenly. Chartering 
pools however could in addition face another problem if a party withdraws since tramp 
vessels may be chartered out to third parties for periods beyond 6 months and 
charterparties do not always give the owner the right to substitute the vessel(s) under 
contract. Withdrawing the vessel before the charterparty is over could be quite 
problematic and this is one reason why the decision to enter charterparties that extend 
for more than 12 months usually requires a unanimous vote of the board. Accordingly it 
could be considered indispensable in some cases to allow longer notice periods.  
Vessels in a pool are usually deemed to be on a “modified time charter” so that the pool 
is responsible for variable voyage costs. This entails a joint buying agreement for these 
costs such as bunkers. In order to achieve reduced variable costs from large volume 
purchasing some form of joint buying is probably indispensable. However such a clause 
is not necessarily indispensable for a joint sales agreement. A pool collects freight 
revenue and then distributes profits after having deducted voyage, administration, and 
possibly some other costs. It would be possible to adjust the calculation of pool points 
to reach the same payout for each participant even if they covered the variable voyage 
costs themselves. In a computerized age such calculations would not involve too much 
extra work. On the other hand the Commission does consider it likely that reduced 
variable costs will benefit the consumer, whilst joint buying in this case is probably less 
likely to significantly restrict competition. 
5.1.4 Elimination of competition 
Finally an agreement will not satisfy article 81(3) if it substantially eliminates 
competition. Some of this analysis is similar to the assessments under the previous three 
conditions. For example in order to determine if there is a net benefit one has to look at 
the level of competition in the market.  Exactly what this condition entails was 
discussed to some extent by the court of first instance in Atlantic Container Line v 
Commission:  
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“..the possibility of eliminating competition……must be assessed as a 
whole, taking into account in particular the specific characteristics of 
the relevant market, the restrictions of competition brought about by 
the agreement, the market shares of the parties to that agreement and 
the extent and intensity of external competition, both actual and 
potential. 
Thus, the greater the restrictions of internal competition between the 
parties, the more necessary it is for external competition to be keen 
and substantial if the agreement is to qualify for exemption. Similarly, 
the larger the market shares of the parties to the agreement, the 
stronger the potential competition must be.”115
 
In the case of chartering pools internal competition between the parties to the agreement 
is eliminated. This is not enough to conclude that this condition is not satisfied. It does, 
however, mean that it is important that there is “keen and substantial” competition in the 
rest of the market. To do this assessment it is necessary to examine actual competitors’ 
ability to compete, and also potential competition. As previously mentioned it is likely 
that there will be potential competitors in most markets due to low barriers to entry. 
Examining actual competitors’ ability to compete would have to be done on an 
individual basis, although as mentioned earlier historical data seems to suggest that 
competition will not have been eliminated even when the market is dominated by a few 
large players. 
Some block exemptions set as a condition that they only apply to undertakings with less 
than a specified market share. This is an expression of the requirement that agreements 
must not eliminate substantial competition. The limit for consortia operating under 
regulation 823/2000 was set to 30% market share when operating within a conference 
and 35% when operating outside a conference. However a consortium could have a 
market share as high as 50% and still be exempt as long as the Commission was notified 
and did not have any objections.116 In general market shares of less than one third have 
been accepted in block exemptions and appear not to be considered by the commission 
to substantially eliminate competition. For higher market shares an individual 
assessment is necessary. In the Atlantic liner case the courts stated that in the case of an 
 
115 Atlantic Container Lines v Commission Case T-395/94  [2002] 
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individual exemption even 50% market share could not automatically lead to the 
conclusion that the fourth condition of Article 81(3) was not satisfied.117 An 
undertaking with a market share of 50% or greater is presumed to be in a dominant 
position which can “clearly be said to afford them the possibility to eliminate 
competition”118, but “eliminating competition” is a narrower concept than “dominant 
position” and an agreement could be regarded as not eliminating competition even 
though it establishes a dominant position for the participants.119  
Bearing in mind that neither regulation 823/2000 nor the Atlantic Liner case covered 
any form of price fixing a chartering pool with a market level approaching 50% may 
well be considered to eliminate competition. 
6 Conclusions 
EC competition law in the maritime sector is currently going through a major overhaul 
with the Commission looking for a new “way forward”. For tramp shipping the 
European Commission’s recommendation in its white paper is quite clear:  “To propose 
a change to Regulation 1/2003, as to remove the current exclusion of tramp and 
cabotage services from its scope.”120  This definite recommendation resulted in quite a 
strong response from the industry and some governments such as Denmark. This may 
result in a more detailed response from the Commission but is unlikely to alter the 
outcome. 
Removing tramp shipping’s exclusion from the scope of regulation 1/2003 will mean 
that tramp shipping in the future will probably be subject to a far stricter control of its 
compliance with Article 81. This in turn may have an effect on the way in which 
shipping companies organize their cooperative joint ventures.  
It is likely that a chartering pool agreement could be found to have as its object the 
restriction of competition. One consequence of this is that the de minimis notice will not 
apply and so no “safe harbour” level of market share exists for chartering pools. It is 
unlikely however that the Commission would instigate proceedings against pools with 
 
116 Regulation 823/2000 Articles 6 and 7 
117 Atlantic Container Lines, paragraph 324 
118 Faull & Nikpay, paragraph 2.172 
119 Atlantic Container Lines, paragraph 330 
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less than 10% market share. This would probably only occur if the Commission were 
concerned over the level of competition in the market. Considering the nature of tramp 
shipping it is unlikely that concerns would be raised at such low market levels.  
Whether chartering pools qualify for exemption under Article 81(3) therefore becomes 
an important question. 
Looking at the individual restrictions in Article 81(3) it is first of all possible to identify 
several benefits that result from chartering pools. There are cost efficiencies that clearly 
benefit the undertakings participating in the pool and qualitative efficiencies from 
improved and more flexible service that benefit and may lead to cost savings for the 
consumer.  
Indispensability raises two issues – Is a joint sales agreement as such necessary to 
achieve the benefits identified? The answer to this is probably yes if one limits oneself 
to looking at JV cooperation between companies however consolidation would produce 
similar benefits for the consumer. Consolidation may increase in the future but is 
probably in part reliant on a continued buoyant market. The other aspect of 
indispensability which looks at restrictions adjunct to the main agreement raises 
questions about the need for non-compete clauses prohibiting the operation of similar 
ships outside the pool. Withdrawal clauses may also be unduly restrictive if they require 
notice periods beyond 6 months. Joint buying may not be indispensable but is unlikely 
to be restrictive to competition in most cases. 
The question of whether the consumer is receiving a fair share involves a difficult, and 
to a certain extent subjective, balancing of benefits and detriments. A fair share requires 
that benefits at least compensate the consumer for any negative impact. Cost 
efficiencies probably mainly benefit the pool whilst some qualitative efficiencies on the 
other hand are of benefit to the consumer. Considering that the benefits from pooling for 
the consumer are also achieved from consolidation detriments probably do not have to 
be too great to outweigh benefits for the consumer.  Weighing these benefits against the 
detrimental effects of a pool will depend greatly on the market power of the pool. The 
extent of a pool’s market power is likely to vary significantly over time. The consensus 
of the shipbroking community seems to be that pools have little or no effect on prices 
when the market is poor or average but do lead to higher prices in a tight market. 
Considering the highly cyclical nature of the shipping market one likely scenario is that 
 
120 White Paper, p.10 
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the benefits of a pool may outweigh detriments for some years followed by a year or 
two when the detriments from higher prices may dominate. Since assessments under 
article 81(3) are made on the basis of the facts as they are at any one time this scenario 
would imply that pools qualify for exemption “seven years out of nine”. Unless this 
issue is addressed by the Commission in its promised guidance on implementation of 
competition rules there will still be uncertainty surrounding the legality of chartering 
pools. This may therefore lead to a restructuring of the joint venture format of 
chartering pools. As mentioned at the very start of the paper full function joint ventures 
will be assessed under merger regulations not Article 81. Future chartering pools may 
therefore be more independent entities than they are today set up as full function joint 
ventures, even though the vessels may still be owned by third parties. Another 
possibility is that the new rules will act as an incentive to consolidate as companies 
merge in order to avoid Article 81 conflicts.   
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